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THE IMPACT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IMPERFECTIONS ON RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION AND WELFARE: CO-OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN BULGARIA 
 
Introduction 
There is a large literature on the impact of property rights on efficient resource use and 
the development of markets.  One of the most dramatic examples of property rights reforms to 
enhance efficiency are the land reform processes which have been implemented ‘from Prague 
to Beijing’ and which have radically changed the rural areas of the transition world – and the 
livelihoods of hundreds of millions of poor households (Deininger, 2003; Rozelle and 
Swinnen, 2004). However, the effect of these land rights reforms has been mixed (Lerman et 
al., 2004).  The negative experiences in some countries, such as Russia in the 1990s, have 
caused a debate with some arguing that the reforms went too fast, while others argued that 
they did not go fast enough and that the lack of clear and well defined property rights is a key 
impediment to growth and recovery. 
While perfect property rights are ultimately desirable, moving towards better but still 
imperfect property rights may yield important gains in efficiency of resource use and market 
development (see eg McMillan, 2002).  In the case of China, where land rights reforms 
induced enormous gains in efficiency and reductions in poverty, it is argued that dramatic 
effects have resulted from more efficient, but still imperfect, property rights of land (Li et al., 
1998). Similarly, studies on land use and investment incentives in Africa, Asia and Europe 
indicate that secure land use rights may be sufficient conditions for efficient land use and 
investments by farmers (Brasselle et al., 2002; Feder and Feeny, 1991; Swinnen, 2002).   
In this paper we use data from a recent survey on land use and allocation in Bulgaria to 
analyse the development of land markets and how imperfections in land rights affect both the 
allocation and exchange of land.  The development of land markets is not only important from   3
an efficiency point of view, but also for equity reasons (Deininger and Feder, 2002; Swinnen, 
2001).   
Land sales have generally been disappointing in transition countries. This is also the 
case in Bulgaria where very little land was sold in the first decade of transition. In contrast, 
land rental markets have developed fast and extensively. In an environment with large 
uncertainties and high transaction costs, where credit markets and insurance markets are 
imperfect, land rental markets can play an important role in improving efficiency and possibly 
equity in land use and access (Deininger and Jin, 2003; Sadoulet et al., 2001; Vranken and 
Swinnen, 2003). 
However, relatively little is known about the behaviour of rental markets in these 
economies either theoretically or empirically.  There is an extensive literature on land rights 
and how transaction costs affect land use and property rights and farm organizations more 
generally (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Barzel, 1997; Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1976; Hyami and 
Otsuka, 1993; Schmitt, 1991). However in order to understand the functioning of land 
markets in transition it is essential to integrate transition specific features. In the previous 
chapter we have developed a theoretical model of land markets in transition. Here, we use 
empirical evidence to get a better understanding of the development and functioning of land 
rental and sales markets in transition by studying the development of land markets in 
Bulgaria, using a unique survey dataset.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The next sections discuss the data, the land reform 
processes in Bulgaria, and the changes in land use and exchange during transition. Then we 
identify several problems with the land market, and we assess quantitatively which factors are 
affecting land use and the development of the land markets.  The final section concludes. 
   4
Data 
Our analysis is based on survey data collected in 2003 in three Bulgarian regions. The 
regions were selected to reflect important variations in the rural economy, agricultural 
structure, property rights (if important) and geographical conditions. We gathered general 
information on all households (1,956) living in and plots (6,199) located in 18 geographically 
closed areas. This information was then used as a sampling frame for gathering more detailed 
plot level and household level information. We draw a stratified sample in order to 
oversample the households renting in land. Due to this stratification, we gathered sufficient 
observations on the variables of interest as renting in land is less widespread. All households 
renting in were selected, complemented by a random sample of all other households in the 
community. Detailed household and plot level data were collected on 700 households and 
4,134 plots.  
 
A brief history of land reform, use, and ownership in Bulgaria 
The collectivisation of Bulgarian agriculture started in the late 1940s.  Initially, three 
types of farm structures were created: collective farms, state farms and machinery and tractor 
stations.  In the early 1970s these were unified into a small number of Agro-Industrial 
Complexes (AICs).  Within the AICs there were four main forms, Labour agricultural co-
operatives (TKZSs), State agricultural farms (SAFs), Machine and tractor stations (MTS) and 
brigades (Davidova et al., 1997).  Two thirds of the AICs land was farmed in TKZSs and 
SAFs.  Brigades were sub-units within AICs with their own balance sheets, who specialised 
on a single crop or livestock production.  Machine and tractor services had no land and 
provided mechanisation services to TKZSs and SAFs. The second group of pre-reform farm 
structures were private household plots. A third group, ‘other organisations’, includes farms   5
attached to research stations, schools and forest enterprises, and also auxiliary farms which 
were part of industrial enterprises and the armed forces.  
Under the central planning system, the majority of land remained in private ownership, 
but the owners could not decide how to allocate their land. This means that they were still 
owners ‘on paper’, but that they had no decision power over their land .  
All this changed dramatically after 1989. First, former communist co-operatives 
(TKZS) were liquidated in the early 1990s and their assets were transferred to a variety of 
new farm organisations, including limited liability companies, share holding companies, joint 
stock companies and new agricultural cooperatives .  
Second, land reforms restituted effective land property rights to former landowners.  In 
the first transition years, farm restructuring and land reform were subject to intense political 
debate, which had a strong impact on the reforms (Swinnen, 1997).   
Land restitution lasted on average 4-5 years, although the speed of the restitution 
process differed throughout the country. Land restitution was slowed by poor evidence on 
former land ownership. In many villages, former registers with land ownership information of 
the pre- collectivisation period were missing (burned, disappeared, etc.).  
At the end of the 1990s, more than 80% of agricultural land titles were restituted to 
individuals. The land restitution process resulted in a strong fragmentation of land ownership. 
On average, land owning households own 3.9 ha of land which are divided into 6 plots with 
each an average size of 0.6 hectares.  
 
The post-transition land market in Bulgaria 
The existence of such a highly fragmented ownership situation increases the need for an 
efficient exchange of land between owners and users of land. Land is used by four types of 
farms: co-operatives, state farms, farming companies and individual farms. The share of   6
arable land used by cooperatives and their average size declined since the start of transition. 
In 2001, their share had fallen to 51% of the agricultural land. Household farms and farming 
companies grew in importance. In 2001, both individual farmes and companies cultivated 
approximately one quarter of agricultural land. 
The land sales market in rural Bulgaria is not well developed. Selling of agricultural 
land is very limited. The main form of land exchange in Bulgaria is through the rental market. 
78% of all land owning households in our survey rent out land and 35% of the land cultivating 
households are renting in land.  Around 40% of the parcels which are owned by the surveyed 
households are rented out to a cooperative and 16% is rented out to a farming company
1.  This 
means that more than half of the parcels owned by rural households are rented out to a farm 
enterprise. Exchanging land among households occurs less frequently.  Only two percent of 
the parcels owned by rural households are exchanged with other households.  18% of the 
parcels are cultivated by the owner.  
Land abandonment is widespread and leaving land fallow for fertility reasons is not 
common in Bulgaria. More than 40% of all land owning households in our 2003 survey leave 
land abandoned, and 23% of the total number of plots owned by rural households are left 
abandoned.  
 
Co-ownership and property rights 
Besides land fragmentation and abandonment, the Bulgarian land market is affected by 
another problem which is that half of the parcels are co-owned by more than one owner.  
Land “co-ownership” results from a combination of four factors: (a) the way land was 
restituted; (b) the current inheritance law; (c) the fragmented 1946 ownership structure; (d) 
the absence of a land market during communism. During the land restitution process, land 
                                                 
1 We see that, at household level, 50% of all land owning households is renting out land to a cooperative and 
29% to a farming company.  Further, 9% of the land owning households are renting out land to another 
household   7
was normally given back to owners prior to 1946. A large part of these owners are no longer 
alive so that the land was given to their heirs. According to the Bulgarian Inheritance Law, 
every heir gets an equal share of the property when the owner dies. If the pre-1946 land owner 
had died, land was divided among the heirs (sometimes even the second generation). If during 
the land reform process X parcels had to be divided among Y owners, then each owner 
received 1/Y share of each of these X parcels. In this way, an equal treatment of heirs was 
assured.  
So far, the issue has received very little attention. However, the magnitude of the 
problem seems to have been vastly underestimated. Our survey shows that rural areas of 
Bulgaria are burdened with co-ownership problems.  According to our survey, 51% of all 
parcels owned by the sampled households are in “co-ownership”. One-fifth of the parcels are 
owned by two persons, another 14% has three co-owners and around 16% of the parcels are 
owned by at least 4 persons.  
Paradoxically, the official reason for the land legislation which causes co-ownership 
was to prevent inefficient land use by avoiding excessive land ownership fragmentation. 
However, the impact may well have been opposite, i.e. that it has constrained efficient land 
use and market development. Before somebody can rent out or sell the land to somebody else, 
they have to agree with all owners. Obviously, this increases transaction costs in land 
allocation, which is likely to hamper exchange and efficient use of land. 
Co-ownership is likely to increase the transaction costs in land decision-making and 
allocation, and therefore lead to imperfect property rights, which may result in suboptimal 
land allocation, use and exchange (Barzel, 1997).  
Decision-making with co-owners is likely to be more costly than without co-ownership, 
depending on the relationship of the various co-owners and their intensity of interacting.  For 
example, if there are few co-owners that are close family members living in the same village,   8
co-ownership may not have much additional decision-making costs.  However, if there are 
more co-owners and/or if they are living far apart with few interactions, additional costs of 
coordination, supervision and enforcing agreements may be substantial.  The dataset includes 
a variety of relationships between co-owners.   
If decision-making on land use is too costly, relative to the potential benefits of land use 
or land renting out, these additional decision-making costs will make it more likely that the 
“default option” will prevail. This default option may be either not using the land, hence 
leaving land abandoned, or leaving land with the traditional users of the land, which are the 
former collective or state farm that are now mostly organized as cooperative farms.  Hence, if 
co-ownership significantly increases the transaction costs in (re-) allocating land, then we 
should expect co-owned land plots to be left more abandoned and to be used more by 
cooperatives, ceteris paribus. 
In the rest of the paper we will use the survey data to estimate how these property right 
imperfections affect land use and land rental activities. Finally, we link land allocation 
decisions to the household’s welfare. 
 
Empirical Model  
Our model incorporates 5 different allocations of owned land: 1) owner-cultivation; 2) 
renting out to another farming household; 3) renting out to a cooperative (which are mostly 
successor organisation of a former collective farm); 4) renting out to a company; 5) 
abandoning. We apply an empirical model which is based on an unordered choice model 
where the household has to make a single decision among several alternatives.  
We use indicator variables to test the impact of property rights imperfections on the 
land allocation decision, while controlling for a variety of differences in plot, household, and 
regional characteristics which may also affect the land allocation decision. The choice of the   9
control variables is based on a model of household land rental decision-making in transition 
countries, developed in Vranken and Swinnen (2003). 
We run a multinomial logit with cluster effects which specifies that the observations are 
independent across households but not necessarily within households. Plot characteristics are 
endogenous since entrepreneurship and social relations might effect what type of land 
(quality, location, plotsize) a former owner received during the restitution process. Hence, we 
ran a similar multinomial regression without the plot variables with potential endogeneity 
problems to check the robustness of our results. The coefficients of this regression as well as 
their significance hardly differ from the results discussed below. 
 
Property right imperfections 
The variable NONDIV is a dummy variable that equals one if a plot is in co-ownership 
and cannot be divided among owners due to the legal imposed minimum size. We expect co-
ownership to lead to decision-making problems, which increase the costs of both using the 
land and of changing the land allocation. Since land was initially used by collective and state 
farms, in many cases the default allocation of land for households was to rent the land to 
cooperative farms and farm companies which emerged from the restructuring of the collective 
and state farms or to leave it abandoned when the farm enterprise ended the rental agreement.  
If a plot cannot be divided among co-owners because of legal impediments, decision making 
becomes more costly. Hence, the probability of the default option increases. It becomes more 
likely that the plot owner is either not using the land, hence leaving land abandoned, or 
leaving land with the traditional user of the land, which is the former collective or state farm, 
now mostly organized as a cooperative farm. 
 The variable NRCOOWN measures the number of co-owners per plot that cannot be 
divided among owners due to the legal imposed minimum size.  Problems of endogeneity rise   10
if  the co-owners are unwilling to divide their land either because none of them is interested in 
cultivating it themselves or because they judge that division of the land does not provide any 
benefits if they are renting it out. Hence, we focus on legally forced co-ownership which 
reduces problems of endogeneity. We expect that the decision-problems and inherent 
transaction costs increase with the number of co-owners.  We would therefore expect that the 
number of co-owners is positively related with land renting to cooperative farms and with 
abandoning of land.   
Some of the co-owners live in the village, while others live outside the village, 
sometimes far away. The co-ordination problems are likely to be larger when co-owners live 
outside the village because interaction is, on average, more complicated and less frequent, and 
monitoring by co-owners is more costly.  Therefore we would expect the impact of the 
previous effects to be stronger when co-owners do not live in the village, compared to when 
they do.  To estimate whether the location of the co-owners matters, we distinguish for the 
plots which can not be divided by law between the number of co-owners living in the village 
(NRCOOWNIN) and the number of co-owners not living in the village (NRCOOWNOUT). 
Endogeneity problems may result from the fact that co-ownership (and hence difficulties in 
allocating their land) has induced some of the co-owners to emigrate out of the village, while 
other households might have immigrated into the sampled communities because they owned 
land which was not in co-ownership and which they could easily start cultivating. However, 
our data indicate that emigration out of the rural areas is rare: in the sampled communities less 
than 5% of the households inhabiting the rural areas at the start of the reforms have emigrated 
at the time of the survey and less than 10% of the households that are currently living in the 
villages are immigrants.  Household who immigrated into the villages are mainly pensioners 
and, compared to the non-immigrant households, significantly less of those immigrated   11




The variable QUALITY is an indicator of land quality based on the Bulgarian land 
classification system and assigns to each plot a score between 1 and 10. A high quality parcel 
gets value one, a low quality parcel gets value ten.  A high quality land plot is more likely to 
be used by either a household farm or a farm enterprise, and we expect it to be negatively 
correlated with abandonment.  
The cost of using a parcel of land increases with the distance of the plot.  The variable 
DISTANCE measures the distance in kilometres of the plot to the house of the owner, and we 
expect a negative impact on owner-cultivation.   
We include the variable PLOTSIZE which equals the size of the plot. We expect that 
larger plots are more suitable for cultivation and expect that this variable is negatively 
correlated with the probability of not using the land. Further, large farming enterprises are 
often relying on more mechanized production techniques so that they are particularly keen in 
cultivated larger plots. 
 
Household and Regional Characteristics 
The variable LANDOWN gives the total amount of land owned by a household. The 
effect of this variable is ambiguous ex ante. In the presence of credit market imperfections, 
owned land, as collateral, can affect access to credit for households.  In such circumstances, 
we expect that the variable LANDOWN will have a positive impact on the probability of 
owner-cultivation. On the other hand, a household with more land, ceteris paribus, is more   12
likely is to have an excess of land compared to its other production factors and hence to rent 
out land.  
We include two sets of indicators of managerial capacity of the household: age 
(AGEHH) and education (EDUHH) of the household head. Other studies (e.g. Rizov et al., 
2001) typically show a non-linear effect of these variables. Therefore, we also include the 
square terms, AGEHH2 and EDUHH2.  The impact of both variables is not obvious ex ante.  
Concerning age, the older a household head, the more experience he has to farm, but younger 
persons may be less risk averse and therefore more likely to use the land themselves.  More 
educated household heads may be better managers, but are also likely to have more off-farm 
opportunities.    
Labour market imperfections in the form of moral hazard problems with hired workers 
affect the household land allocation decision.  Family members maximize family welfare 
rather than individual welfare and have therefore fewer incentives to shirk which makes 
family labour less expensive than hired labour. Hence, it is more likely that a household will 
cultivate its own land if more household labour is available. We take this into account by 
including a variable measuring the household size. However, endogeneity concerns rise 
because the decision to leave the household might be correlated with the income that can be 
generated from cultivating the land owned by the household. Therefore, we instrumented for 
the actual household size by looking at the natural household, which equals all current 
household members augmented with those sons and daughters who moved out.  Since this 
instrument does not entirely solve the endogeneity problem, we here only show regressions 
were this variable is not taken into account. However, inclusion of the actual or adjusted 
household size did hardly change the regression results (see appendix).   
Finally, we control for regional differences by including the variable NORTH-EAST 
and SOUTH-EAST, two dummy variables that equal one if the plot is located respectively in   13
Dobrich and Varna, or in Veliko Tarnovo. The default region is the South-Central region 
which holds Plovdiv and Stara Zagora. 
 
Results 
The multinomial regression results with owner-cultivation as base category are given in 
table 1. Table 2 gives the regression results with renting out to a cooperative as base category. 
Since our prime interest in this paper is the impact of property rights imperfections, we focus 
mostly on these findings. 
  First, the estimation results show that property right imperfections under the form of 
co-ownership have a strong impact on the allocation of land in Bulgaria.  Land is more likely 
to be rented out to a cooperative or left abandoned relative to owner-cultivation if the parcel is 
in co-ownership and undividable by law, i.e. if the parcel is in “forced” co-ownership.   
Second, the multinomial logit regression indicate that the probability to rent out land to 
a cooperative or leaving land abandoned relative to owner-cultivation increases with the 
number of owners.  An increase in the number of coowners decreases the likelihood of owner-
cultivation, renting out to a company or households, and abandonment relative to renting out 
to a cooperative. The strong positive impact of “forced” co-ownership on renting out to a 
cooperative and negative impact on owner-cultivation indicates that the law concerning the 
minimum plot size strongly favours large scale farming organisations at the disadvantage of 
household farms.  
Third, our estimations further show that the impact of the number of co-owners does 
depend on whether they are living in or outside the village. The probability to leave the plot 
abandoned relative to owner-cultivation increases with the number of co-owners that are 
living outside the village, but the number of co-owners living inside the village does not affect 
the probability of abandonment. While the coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that   14
co-ordination problems are higher when co-owners are living farther away, alternative 
explanations can not be ruled out.  If for example more co-owners are living outside the 
village, their social connectedness can be lower so that they received parcels of lower quality 
during the land reform process. Further, the likelihood that one of the owners is interested to 
cultivate the land will be decrease with the number of owners living outside the village.  
Other plot characteristics have an important impact on the allocation decision: land 
quality, distance and plot size all have a significant impact on the likelihood of abandoning 
the plot, and the impacts are as hypothesized.  As expected, increased distance of the plot to 
the house decreases the likelihood of owner-cultivation and increases the likelihood of land 
abandonment. Further, larger plots are less likely to be left abandoned. 
  Characteristics of the household also have an impact. There is a significant impact of 
the variable AGEHH. The probability that a land owner leaves its plot abandoned first 
decreases with age. However, at the pension entitled age, the relation reverses and the 
likelihood of land abandonment increases.  
 
Welfare implications 
An important question related to imperfect property rights relates to the impact on 
household welfare. Since welfare is multidimensional, an income presentation of poverty can 
be restrictive as a measure of household welfare. Therefore, we define for each household an 
alternative welfare index based on the ownership of certain assets/items.
 2 We aggregated 
these various indicators using principal component analysis (Finan et al., 2003).
3 To analyse 
the impact of land and land property rights imperfections on the household’s welfare, we run 
an ordinary least square regression with the welfare index as dependent variable and land and 
                                                 
2 We looked whether the household owned a house, car, color TV, black and white TV, video, personal 
computer, telephone, mobile phone. 
3 When calculating the principal components, the first Eigen value captures more than 33% of the total variance 
and is twice as high as the next Eigen value. We therefore use this first component as our welfare index.   15
human capital characteristics as regressors. Plot level characteristics are excluded because 
welfare is analysed at household level. 
Several studies documented the positive association between land and income. Hence, it 
reasonable to assume that land ownership is affecting the household’s welfare. Since 
wealthier households are more likely to buy land for investment purposes, inclusion of land 
endowment in our regression might result in endogeneity problems. However, land purchases 
are very rare in rural Bulgaria. Less than 3% of the surveyed households bought land since the 
start of transition.  A more recent WB survey in 2004 confirms that only 3.5% of all rural 
households sold land and only 1% bought land since the start of transition. Consequently, land 
ownership depends on the amount of land over which the household always kept title (even 
thought they had no effective use rights during communism) augmented with amount received 
through the land reform process and we can assume that it is an exogenous factor. 
 In our welfare regression, we distinguish between the amount of land owned solely by 
the household (OWNSOLE) and the amount of land owned by the household but as a part of 
larger co-owned plot (COOWNED). Thus, this variable equals the size of the co-owned parcel 
divided by the number of co-owners. To look at the impact of land fragmentation, we also 
include the number of plots which are not in co-ownership (NROWNSOLE) and the number 
of plots (NRCOOWN) which are in co-ownership. Next, we look at the impact of land 
ownership without making a distinction between co-owned and not co-owned land. The total 
amount of land owned by the household is captured by the variable OWN and the variable 
NROWN gives the number of different plots owned by the household. We hyposthesize that 
fragmentation of land ownership is negatively affecting the household’s welfare as it 
increases transaction costs in allocating the plots. Nevertheless, fragmentation of land 
ownership can persist because the non-production value of land and the inaccurate land rights 
records might result in thin land sales market (Mearns, 1999).   16
Further, we split the amount of land owned according to its allocation to analyse 
whether this has an impact on the household’s welfare. We distinguish between the amount of 
land used by the owner (AREAOWNER), the amount rented out to an other household 
(AREATOHH), to a farming company (AREATOCOMP or to a cooperative 
(AREATOCOOP) and the amount of land left abandoned (AREAABANDON).  
Finally, we want to know to what extent the possibility to cultivate land is related to the 
household’s welfare. We include the variable CULT that equals the amount of land cultivated 
by the households. The correlation between welfare and the fragmentation of land use 
(NRCULT) is not clear ex ante. On the one hand, there might be a negative correlation as 
fragmentation of land use increases travel time between fields resulting in lower labour 
productivity and higher transportation costs and it raises the potential for disputes. On the 
other hand, land fragmentation can have some advantages since it can ease seasonal labor-
bottlenecks, reduce risk and enhance household-level food security. These advantages are 
particularly important if land quality is not homogeneous, when no alternative risk 
mechanisms are available or when commodity market failures are significant (Blarel et al., 
1992).   
As human capital variables, we include age and education level of the household head 
(AGEHH and EDUHH). Finally, we take regional fixed effects into account by including 
regional dummy variables.   
Concerns might rise about the correlation between land ownership and other key 
variables as age and education of the household head. However, the correlation matrix 
indicates that there is no important correlation between land ownership (nor amount of land 
owned solely by one household, nor coowned land, nor the total amount of owned land) and 
the age or education level of the household head. The correlation coefficients are very small 
and in most cases not significantly different from zero.    17
Our results confirm that there is positive and significant correlation between the   
amount of land owned solely by one household and its welfare (table 6). The correlation 
between amount of land in co-ownership and the household’s welfare is positive as well. The 
coefficient of the variable OWNEDSOLE is not significantly different from the coefficient of 
the variable COOWN. This indicates that land ownership is positively correlated with welfare 
irrespective the fact that it is in co-ownership. 
The household’s welfare is, as we expected, negatively correlated with land ownership 
fragmentation. However, the correlation with the fragmentation of land use is significantly 
positive suggesting that land use fragmentation is not disadvantageous for the household’s 
welfare as it allows the household to spread their risk and relax seasonal labour bottlenecks.  
If we split the amount of land owned according to the allocation, we see that, ceteris 
paribus, the welfare level is significantly positively correlated with  the amount of land used 
by the owner as well as with the area rented out to an other household or company, while 
there is no correlation between the amount of land rented to a cooperative or left abandoned 
and the welfare level of the household. Moreover, the coefficient of the amount of land used 
by the owner is significantly different from the coefficient of the amount of land rented out to 
a cooperative or left abandoned. The latter insinuates that the household’s welfare is not 
improved when it owns land which is left abandoned or which it rents out to a cooperative, 
two allocations which are more likely for land which is in legally forced co-ownership. 
 
Conclusion 
This study used a unique 2003 survey dataset to analyse the developments in land use 
and exchange in Bulgaria.  The survey analysis yields several results.   18
Land is highly fragmented in Bulgaria.  Rural households own on average 6 plots of 
land. Such a highly fragmented ownership structure increases the need for an efficient 
exchange of land between owners and users of land.   
However, the land sales market is not well developed. Land sales are very rare. As in 
many other transition countries, a variety of factors have constrained the development of the 
land sales market. 
In contrast, land rental agreements are very widespread.  Land rental is widely used to 
exchange land between owners and users of the land.  The users include a variety of farm 
types, including cooperatives, farming companies, and individual farms. 
While land titles are distributed and land plots clearly defined and delineated, an 
important property rights problem that affects land allocation exists under the form of so-
called “co-ownership”.  Due to a combination of historical factors, many plots have more than 
one owner and in some cases many more. By law, certain plots are undividable among heirs 
because the plot size after division would fall under the imposed minimum plot size. Co-
ownership on agricultural land is widespread in Bulgaria: half of the plots in our sample are 
owned by more than one person. 
Our estimation results show that co-ownership has a major impact on land use and 
allocation.  Land under co-ownership and which is undividable by law, is more likely to be 
left abandoned or to be used by large enterprises – the default users of land given the history 
of land use in Bulgaria – compared to owner-cultivation or renting out to an other household. 
Paradoxically, these effects result from a legislation that was intended to prevent 
fragmentation of land and inefficient land use. The legislation is a prime cause of the co-
ownership situation and strongly affects efficient land use and allocation. 
Our analysis shows that solving co-ownership problems would not only stimulate 
efficient land allocation and that this in turn affects the household’s welfare level. Land that is   19
cultivated by the household or rented to an other household contributes more to its welfare 
than land that is rented to a cooperative or left abandoned.  Table 1: Multinomial regression result with owner-cultivation as base category and cluster effects 



















NONDIV  -0.019  0.977***  0.148  0.412**          
  (0.056)  (5.333)  (0.450)  (2.218)          
NRCOOWNER      -0.065  0.401***  0.141  0.204***      
      (0.508)  (6.825)  (1.426)  (3.166)      
NRCOOWNERIN          0.121  0.489***  0.227  0.105 
          (0.563)  (4.500)  (1.245)  (0.922) 
NRCOOWNEROUT          -0.171  0.363***  0.087  0.240*** 
          (1.041)  (4.560)  (0.636)  (2.907) 
QUALITY  -0.145 0.093**  -0.436***  0.452***  -0.143 0.092** -0.445***  0.450***  -0.141  0.094** -0.442***  0.449*** 
  (1.266) (2.208) (5.458) (10.217)  (1.251) (2.206) (5.412) (10.275)  (1.236) (2.255) (5.379) (10.255) 
DISTANCE  0.337*** 0.337*** 0.314*** 0.359*** 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.301*** 0.345*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.301*** 0.344*** 
  (4.748) (4.942) (4.501) (5.250) (4.609) (4.768) (4.376) (5.104) (4.587) (4.747) (4.353) (5.071) 
PLOTSIZE  0.009 -0.002  0.000 -0.085***  0.008 -0.002  0.001 -0.080***  0.008 -0.002  0.001 -0.081*** 
  (1.015) (0.265) (0.038) (4.238) (1.044) (0.360) (0.158) (4.298) (1.094) (0.324) (0.178) (4.335) 
LANDOWN  -0.010** 0.003*  0.003  0.003*  -0.009** 0.002**  0.002  0.002**  -0.010** 0.002*  0.002  0.002** 
  (2.407) (1.855) (1.629) (1.928) (2.374) (2.044) (1.614) (1.983) (2.459) (1.952) (1.575) (2.147) 
AGEHH  0.056 -0.017  0.077 -0.200***  0.064 0.034 0.096 -0.182***  0.070 0.037 0.102 -0.191*** 
  (0.452) (0.270) (0.754) (3.483) (0.513) (0.535) (0.929) (3.123) (0.569) (0.586) (0.950) (3.380) 
AGEHH2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002***  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002***  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
  (0.284) (0.667) (0.352) (4.164) (0.342) (0.076) (0.524) (3.834) (0.400) (0.116) (0.561) (4.074) 
EDUHH  -0.383 0.133  0.067  -0.040 -0.372 0.142  0.081  -0.036 -0.383 0.134  0.073  -0.024 
  (1.581) (0.721) (0.305) (0.238) (1.576) (0.801) (0.389) (0.219) (1.622) (0.758) (0.347) (0.149) 
EDUHH2  0.023* -0.009 0.002  0.005  0.022* -0.009 0.002  0.005  0.023* -0.009 0.002  0.004 
  (1.841) (1.002) (0.190) (0.573) (1.833) (1.102) (0.147) (0.570) (1.875) (1.056) (0.190) (0.498) 
North-East  0.992** 0.946***  0.263  -2.172***  0.986** 0.944***  0.300  -2.244***  1.011** 0.982***  0.317  -2.260*** 
  (2.111) (2.865) (0.792) (2.833) (2.123) (2.879) (0.936) (2.826) (2.170) (2.978) (0.982) (2.947) 
South-Central  -0.454 -0.101 -1.626***  -1.194***  -0.454 -0.113 -1.617***  -1.195***  -0.427 -0.072 -1.599***  -1.253*** 
  (1.029) (0.449) (4.905) (6.643) (1.023) (0.504) (5.023) (6.708) (0.953) (0.315) (4.850) (6.956) 
Constant  -2.501 -1.791 -3.264 2.251  -2.775 -3.415 -3.956 1.694  -2.928 -3.494*  -4.092 1.985 
  (0.611) (0.878) (0.911) (1.176) (0.672) (1.617) (1.086) (0.864) (0.715) (1.687) (1.099) (1.042) 
Observations  3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 
t- statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Multinomial logit with renting out to a cooperative as base category and cluster effects 
 Owner-
cultivation 




Rent to hh  Rent to coop Abandon  Owner-
cultivation 
Rent to hh  Rent to coop Abandon 
NONDIV  -0.977***  -0.996***  -0.829**  -0.566***         
  (5.333  (2.967)  (2.553)  (3.132)          
NRCOOWNER      -0.401*** -0.466*** -0.260*** -0.197***     
      (6.825)  (3.813)  (2.643)  (4.007)      
NRCOOWNERIN          -0.489*** -0.367*  -0.261  -0.384*** 
          (4.500)  (1.780)  (1.380)  (4.349) 
NRCOOWNEROUT          -0.363*** -0.533*** -0.276**  -0.123** 
          (4.560)  (3.300)  (2.320)  (2.099) 
QUALITY  -0.093** -0.238** -0.529*** 0.359*** -0.092** -0.235** -0.538*** 0.358*** -0.094** -0.235** -0.536*** 0.355*** 
  (2.208  (2.128) (7.103) (8.377) (2.206) (2.104) (6.899) (8.380) (2.255) (2.115) (6.879) (8.305) 
DISTANCE -0.337***  0.000  -0.023  0.022***  -0.322*** 0.001 -0.021  0.024***  -0.321*** 0.001 -0.021  0.023*** 
  (4.942  (0.008) (1.376) (3.204) (4.768) (0.069) (1.264) (2.932) (4.747) (0.040) (1.277) (3.215) 
PLOTSIZE  0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.083*** 0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.078*** 0.002 0.010 0.002 -0.079*** 
  (0.265  (1.521) (0.955) (4.306) (0.360) (1.505) (1.233) (4.302) (0.324) (1.566) (1.220) (4.348) 
LANDOWN  -0.003*  -0.013***  0.000 0.000 -0.002**  -0.012*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002*  -0.012*** 0.000 0.000 
  (1.855  (3.223) (0.175) (0.185) (2.044) (3.064) (0.001) (0.248) (1.952) (3.118) (0.029) (0.159) 
AGEHH  0.017 0.073 0.094 -0.183*** -0.034  0.030 0.062 -0.217*** -0.037  0.033 0.065 -0.228*** 
  (0.270  (0.593) (0.902) (2.654) (0.535) (0.239) (0.588) (3.082) (0.586) (0.273) (0.591) (3.578) 
AGEHH2  0.000 -0.001  -0.001  0.002***  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002***  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
  (0.667  (0.642) (0.773) (2.853) (0.076) (0.306) (0.468) (3.259) (0.116) (0.344) (0.478) (3.701) 
EDUHH  -0.133 -0.516***  -0.066 -0.173 -0.142 -0.514*** -0.061 -0.178 -0.134 -0.517*** -0.061 -0.158 
  (0.721  (2.805) (0.377) (1.036) (0.801) (2.773) (0.337) (1.063) (0.758) (2.759) (0.337) (0.963) 
EDUHH2  0.009 0.032***  0.011 0.014 0.009 0.032***  0.011 0.014 0.009 0.032***  0.011 0.013 
  (1.002  (3.209) (1.269) (1.566) (1.102) (3.183) (1.204) (1.614) (1.056) (3.163) (1.196) (1.524) 
North-East -0.946***  0.046  -0.683**  -3.118*** -0.944*** 0.042 -0.644*  -3.188*** -0.982*** 0.028 -0.665*  -3.242*** 
  (2.865  (0.106) (1.985) (4.070) (2.879) (0.096) (1.947) (4.014) (2.978) (0.065) (1.954) (4.222) 
South-Central  0.101 -0.353  -1.524*** -1.093*** 0.113 -0.341 -1.504*** -1.082*** 0.072  -0.355 -1.527*** -1.180*** 
  (0.449  (0.805) (4.119) (4.964) (0.504) (0.771) (4.117) (4.937) (0.315) (0.790) (3.982) (5.229) 
Constant  1.791 -0.710  -1.473  4.042*  3.415 0.640 -0.541  5.109**  3.494*  0.566 -0.598  5.479*** 
  (0.878  (0.174) (0.398) (1.838) (1.617) (0.156) (0.144) (2.279) (1.687) (0.139) (0.155) (2.700) 
Observations  3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 3575 
t- statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   22 
Table 3: OLS regression with the welfare index as dependent variable, excluding household size 
 Welfare  Index 
AGEHH  -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.033*** 
  (8.129) (7.862) (8.239) (7.859) (6.987) (6.612) 
EDUHH  0.071*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 
  (3.649) (3.714) (3.723) (3.729) (4.397) (4.041) 
OWNEDSOLE  0.013***  0.013***      
  (5.913)  (5.192)      
NROWNSOLE   -0.012      
   (0.607)      
COOWN  0.011**  0.018***      
  (2.437)  (3.254)      
NR  COOWN   -0.031**      
   (2.320)      
OWN    0.013***  0.014***   0.012*** 
    (6.121)  (6.357)   (5.637) 
NROWN     -0.023**   -0.030*** 
     (2.085)   (2.616) 
AREA  USED  BY  OWNER      0.016***   
      ( 4 . 2 0 0 )    
AREA  RENT  TO  OTHER  HH      0.023***   
      ( 4 . 5 9 8 )    
AREA  RENT  TO  COMP      0.007***   
      ( 2 . 9 1 1 )    
AREARENT  TO  COOP      0.005***   
      ( 2 . 9 6 2 )    
AREA  ABANDONED     -0.008   
      ( 1 . 3 4 7 )    
C U L T I V        0 . 0 0 3 *  
       ( 1 . 8 0 8 )  
N R C U L T        0 . 0 9 0 * * *  
       ( 2 . 9 2 7 )  
NORTH-EAST  0.053 -0.022  0.060 -0.042  0.093 -0.014 
  (0.346) (0.138) (0.402) (0.262) (0.622) (0.086) 
SOUTH-CENTRAL  0.504*** 0.525*** 0.506*** 0.520*** 0.488*** 0.451*** 
  (3.849) (4.006) (3.907) (4.005) (3.635) (3.495) 
Constant  1.386*** 1.420*** 1.375*** 1.417*** 1.002**  0.942** 
  (3.167) (3.247) (3.185) (3.263) (2.326) (2.144) 
Observations  700 700 700 700 700 700 
R-squared  0.211 0.217 0.216 0.215 0.225 0.241 
t- statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 